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Pharmaceuticals and the Worldwide HIV
Epidemic: Can a Stakeholder Model Work?
John E. Calfee and Roger Bate
The worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic has generated intense criticism of pharmaceutical drug prices, a
natural consequence of the industry’s unique cost structure. Many people have proposed that the
industry adopt what might be called a stakeholder model in place of the traditional profit-driven
model. However, the rapid drop in HIV drug prices, combined with generic entry and de facto
abandonment of patent rights, has revealed the extremely limited role of drug prices and access in the
face of fundamental problems in infrastructure, prevention, and other essential elements in battling
HIV/AIDS. Adoption of a stakeholder approach is likely to undermine essential research and
development while doing little to curtail the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
John E. Calfee is Resident Scholar (e-mail: calfeej@aei.org), and
Roger Bate is Visiting Fellow (e-mail: rbate@aei.org), American
Enterprise Institute. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research
and editorial assistance of Ximena Pinell of the American Enterprise
Institute.
A
s the HIV/AIDS epidemic has spread from wealthy
nations to poor ones, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
the pharmaceutical industry has received an extraordi-
nary volume of criticism of the prices and patents of the HIV
drugs that can delay the onset of AIDS. However, HIV
drugs are by no means the only topic of criticism in recent
years. Controversy has extended to prices in the United
States, international price disparities among wealthy nations
(which has led to proposals to import drugs at foreign
government-controlled prices; see Wilson 2004), marketing
and promotion, and research priorities (Angell 2004;
Goozner 2004). Such criticism is hardly new. The 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which
greatly expanded Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reg-
ulation and revolutionized drug development, followed on
high-profile Senate hearings that were highly critical of
pharmaceutical research, pricing, and promotion. A report
from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (1968; predecessor to the Department of Health and
Human Services) listed, in vivid terms, a series of criticisms
that would sound familiar today (see also Journal of
Research in Pharmaceutical Economics 2001).
However, international HIV drug prices and patents have
probably generated the most bitter criticisms to date, bring-
ing serious threats to the industry’s foundations, including
intellectual property. This wide-ranging debate has gener-
ated proposals to fundamentally transform the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. To some extent, these ideas focus on public
policy toward patents, prices, government reimbursement,
and so on.
Another line of thought suggests that the industry should
transform itself to align its practices more closely with
wider public interests. The idea (see Kennedy, Harris, and
Lord 2004; Reisel and Sama 2003) is that the industry
should abandon its traditional capitalistic model and pursue
what might be called a stakeholder model. The stakeholder
approach is not clearly defined because it represents certain
parties’ ideals rather than actual practice. Firms would pre-
sumably begin with the needs of potential consumers,
regardless of their ability to pay. Moving well beyond their
core business of developing and marketing drugs at a profit,
firms would undertake such activities as (1) ensuring ade-
quate access to their products (where “access” generally
means price restraint); (2) abridging or moderating their
intellectual property claims, including patents; (3) redeploy-
ing research and development (R&D) efforts to address
tropical diseases and other diseases endemic in poor nations;
and (4) providing financial and in-kind support for measures
that are necessary to ensure that drugs are used where they
are needed and correctly. In the full blossoming of this
approach, the industry would cater to the core interests of all
major stakeholders: pharmaceutical firms, patients, health
care providers, and payers including governments and
domestic and international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). This would involve lower prices, higher expendi-
tures, lower profits (perhaps dramatically), and close coop-
eration with NGOs and international agencies, such as the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations
(UN).
In contrast to the stakeholder model is the traditional cap-
italistic model, in which pharmaceutical R&D, marketing,
and delivery are driven by the profit motive. To a tolerable
approximation, this model can be viewed as profit maxi-
mization that is subject to several constraints. Such con-
straints include foreign price controls, price regulations in
certain parts of the U.S. government (mainly the Veteran’s
Affairs [VA] and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid), the vagaries
of FDA regulation (which covers manufacturing and mar-
keting in addition to new drug approvals), the power of
pharmaceutical benefit managers and their clients in man-
aged care, and, ultimately, consumer preferences. The pur-
suit of this traditional model also includes lobbying and
public relations to protect the essentials of pharmaceutical
R&D, including patents and other forms of intellectual prop-
erty, along with freedom in pricing and marketing. It alsoJournal of Public Policy & Marketing 141
1Cohen (2001) recounts the tangled history of HIV’s discovery, the
enduring controversy with respect to priority, and the intense debate about
whether HIV was indeed the primary cause of AIDS. Gottlieb (2001) pro-
vides a convenient synopsis of this history.
includes differential pricing (sometimes involving much
lower prices in poor nations), free or nominally priced
drugs, and public–private partnerships in which pharmaceu-
tical firms cut prices and provide support services. An
example is Merck’s “Mectizan Donation Program.” From
1987, Merck has donated its drug Mectizan (ivermectin) to
anyone afflicted with river-blindness, for as long as the drug
is needed. Most drugs go to Africa, Latin America, and
Yemen. In 2002, the 250 millionth dose was donated
(Merck 2002).
In general, when we use the term “stakeholder,” we have
in mind international agencies such as the WHO and the UN
and its affiliates (including UNAIDS), along with NGOs.
The latter range from wealthy funding organizations (e.g.,
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) to quasi-academic
groups such as the International AIDS Society, advocacy
groups such as Act-Up, and organizations that provide ser-
vices and advocacy (e.g., Médicines sans Frontiers, also
known as Doctors Without Borders). Many of these NGOs
perform extremely valuable tasks, and their often insightful
views merit being heard and attended to. However, our con-
cern here is with a system in which these groups and orga-
nizations would exercise power over, set policies for, or
even allocate resources for the pharmaceutical industry in
connection with HIV/AIDS. This stakeholder model would
extend beyond traditional modes of regulation and non-
governmental advocacy and funding. Our many references
to the views and criticisms of the various stakeholder groups
should be construed as an assessment of their possible
effects in a world in which the pharmaceutical industry has
adopted a full-scale stakeholder approach to HIV/AIDS.
The issue is not whether these groups are well-intentioned
or wise, but what they would have the industry do if the
stakeholder model were adopted.
In this article, we assess the stakeholder model for the
pharmaceutical industry and give special attention to how
this approach might work in connection with the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Before doing so, it is useful to review the basic
facts of the epidemic, the drugs that are used to combat it,
drug prices and the circumstances surrounding them, and the
prospects for new drugs and other methods that are neces-
sary to curtail the epidemic.
The Worldwide HIV/AIDS Epidemic
The first case of AIDS was identified in June 1981 by sci-
entists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
who were intrigued by a series of similar reports from the
University of California, Los Angeles, Medical Center of
rare illnesses among five homosexual men (Gottlieb 2001;
Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report 1981). Two years
later, the retrovirus dubbed HIV (human immunodeficiency
virus) was identified as the cause of AIDS; it had been caus-
ing isolated infections for at least several years before the
1981 publication.1 Although the latency period between
HIV infection and full-blown AIDS can last for many years,
untreated HIV eventually kills all its victims. In the past 23
years, HIV infection has spread globally (the exact sources
remain shrouded in mystery, but human HIV probably
derived from African chimpanzees; see Stebbing, Gazzard,
and Douek 2004). The agency UNAIDS recently estimated
that 38 million people are infected with HIV worldwide.
AIDS has claimed more than 20 million deaths, including 3
million in 2003 (UNAIDS 2004). Both numbers continue to
increase.
Hardest hit by far have been the extremely poor nations of
sub-Saharan Africa, where infection rates exceed 35% in
Botswana and Swaziland and 20% in South Africa
(Halperin and Epstein 2004). Life spans in that region have
been substantially reduced even as they have steadily
increased nearly everywhere else (United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2004). Both HIV and AIDS have spread to
all parts of Asia, as well as Russia and some other parts of
the former Soviet Union, giving rise to considerable alarm
that an African-style epidemic might emerge in far more
populous areas (Eberstadt 2002). This has not happened to
date, and there are reasons to hope that HIV rates in most of
Asia, at least, will remain modest (Ruxrungtham, Brown,
and Phanuphakp 2004).
HIV is transmitted, though not easily, by unprotected sex
and far more easily by needle sharing or blood transfusions
(Lancet 2004). Therefore, infection is relatively easy to pre-
vent through individual behavior. That the HIV epidemic
continues to surge is an indication of the difficulties that
social marketing in poor nations and regions faces. The epi-
demic has largely bypassed nonsubstance-abusing hetero-
sexuals in advanced economies and has ebbed and surged
among homosexuals in response to behavioral trends
(EXPLORE Study Team 2004; Stolte et al. 2004).
HIV is extremely difficult to control or eradicate after
infection has occurred. AIDS itself is amenable only to pal-
liative or delaying treatments, and victims remain exposed
to virulent opportunistic infections. In general, the science
of HIV is exceptionally difficult to unravel and apply
(Cohen 2001, 2002).
Worldwide HIV Drug Prices and the
Pharmaceutical Industry Crisis
HIV/AIDS Drug Development
The creation of several generations of drugs to treat HIV
and AIDS is a remarkable story in the history of pharma-
ceuticals. Research began immediately after HIV was iden-
tified and continued even as scientists debated the causal
role of HIV in AIDS. Government-funded research played a
large role (Goozner 2004, Ch. 4), but private investment
soon surpassed public research to bring the bulk of HIV
drugs to market. The first HIV drug, AZT, was approved in
March 1987, only four years after the discovery of HIV (the
drug had been studied for other uses; see Goozner 2004, Ch.
4), but for several years it was the only FDA-approved HIV
drug. Ddi, the first nucleoside reverse transcriptase
inhibitor, was approved in 1991. In 1995 came the first pro-
tease inhibitors, followed by the first nonnucleoside reverse
transcriptase inhibitors. The protease inhibitors inaugurated
what has become known as highly active antiretroviral ther-
apy (HAART), the foundation of HIV treatment in all
nations. Many of these drugs were created, tested, and142 Pharmaceuticals and the HIV Epidemic
brought to market with extraordinary speed, given the sci-
entific challenges posed by HIV. The protease inhibitors
rapidly and drastically reduced AIDS mortality, enabling
many victims to lead fairly complete lives (Palella et al.
1998). By 2004, the FDA had approved nearly 30 individual
HIV drugs (PhRMA 2003).
HIV/AIDS drugs have brought the industry into contro-
versy primarily because of their prices, but other aspects of
these drugs are extremely important. Indeed, if HIV drugs
were as simple to use as, for example, the statin class of
cholesterol-reducing drugs (e.g., atorvastatin, sold in the
United States as Lipitor), the dispute over pricing would
probably have long since been solved with little threat of
disruption of the industry. An appreciation of certain aspects
of HIV/AIDS drugs is necessary to understand the contro-
versies these drugs have caused.
Most important are the characteristics of HIV itself. Its
odd method of reproduction eludes the body’s immune sys-
tem but is extremely error prone. HIV mutations are routine,
not merely as it spreads across a population but within a
patient during treatment (Clavel and Hance 2004). Thus,
HIV usually survives and eventually thrives when attacked
by a single medicine, so that multidrug treatment is neces-
sary. Drug resistance is a formidable problem, eventually
overwhelming all others because all treatments eventually
fail (Sande and Ronald 2004, p. 267).
Compliance with therapy is essential. Incomplete, poorly
monitored regimens may provide only temporary help for an
individual patient while fostering drug resistance in trans-
mittable pathogens, which then create a pool of therapy-
resistant patients. The temptation for individual patients to
curtail therapy because of costs, side effects, or other rea-
sons creates a dangerous externality. These trade-offs raise
difficulties in both medical administration and public pol-
icy, because provision of drugs to patients who discontinue
or interrupt therapy can harm the community. The gravity of
these problems has captured the attention of both the med-
ical community and the general public (Altman 2004.) In
their editorial, Sande and Ronald (2004, p. 267) note that
meeting treatment goals requires “meticulous, rigorous,
compulsive attention to adherence in each patient.” Unfor-
tunately, even compliant therapy can cause problems. A
recent study on the use of nevirapine alone to prevent pre-
natal mother–child transmission concluded that a single
dose significantly increased the probability of inducing drug
resistance in both mother and child (Jourdain et al. 2004; see
also Coovadia 2004). When the results were published, the
South African government announced that it would switch
to a more expensive combination drug. The International
AIDS Society immediately attacked that decision on the
grounds that the higher cost would result in fewer children
being protected (LaFraniere 200).
The science and technology of HIV drugs has had other
effects on their use. Some HIV drugs are difficult and
expensive to manufacture. Although some drugs compete
with one another, the multifaceted nature of HIV infection
usually requires the use of several drugs simultaneously.
Drug resistance often requires switching drugs. Opportunis-
tic infections and endemic illnesses such as tuberculosis
(TB) lead to complex comorbidities in which HIV is not the
only condition requiring drug treatment. This can lead to
dangerous drug interactions as well as complex and chang-
ing therapies. Unfortunately, simultaneous HIV and TB
infections are extremely common. The TB Alliance (2004)
estimates that approximately half of the 30 million HIV-
infected people worldwide also have TB.
HIV drugs tend to be powerful, with dangerous side
effects. Determining when to use them, how much to use,
and when to interrupt or cease therapy requires the use of
diagnostic tests to assess CD4 cell counts and monitor HIV
viral load. This typically requires expert administration and
is itself costly. Multidrug therapy complicates these choices
and procedures.
Although a few HIV-positive patients in modern health
care systems lead relatively normal lives for years while
receiving drug treatment, these drugs are not cures. They are
largely palliatives, and for most patients they eventually lose
efficacy as HIV mutates.
Pricing
HIV drug pricing is driven by the same forces that govern
virtually all drug pricing. Pharmaceuticals are characterized
by large costs, lengthy development times, and great finan-
cial risk both while drugs are under development (because
even the most promising compounds usually fail in clinical
trials) and after they are approved (Spilker 1994). In the
most extensive research on new drug development costs,
DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003) conclude that, on
average, each new compound developed in the 1990s cost
approximately $800 million (estimated for 1997, with costs
expected to increase at almost 7% annually thereafter). The
researchers also conclude that the returns are so unpre-
dictable that only about three of every ten new drugs gener-
ate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of their develop-
ment (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi 2002).
New drugs are protected by patents. In recent years,
patents have extended for 20 years from filing, typically
leaving perhaps 8 to 15 years of patent protection after clin-
ical trials and the FDA approval process. Manufacturers of
patented drugs are free to charge market prices in the United
States, albeit with important restrictions for certain govern-
ment programs, including the VA and Medicaid. In the
United States, the provisions of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman
Act generally permit manufacturers to enter the market with
generic versions shortly after patents expire, which quickly
drives down prices of major drugs. However, the Hatch-
Waxman Act does not apply to “biologicals,” which are
drugs that are essentially grown or generated through bio-
logical processes rather than synthesized as relatively sim-
ple chemical compounds. Some HIV drugs (e.g., Emtriva)
are biologicals.
This cost structure generates pricing behavior with two
dominant characteristics. First, prices will typically be well
above the marginal costs of manufacturing and distribution,
as manufacturers seek to realize the profits that initially
motivated research investment. Profit margins are usually
restrained, sometimes substantially, by competition from
similar drugs (Lichtenberg and Philipson 2002). However,
different HIV drugs treat slightly different conditions or put
new mechanisms to work when competing drugs fail. These
fairly basic differences presumably inhibit price competi-
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cholesterol-reducing statin drugs or the selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitor antidepressants, in which case differences
among drugs, though often important, are not so great as to
forestall competition when manufacturers bargain with buy-
ers. When patents expire, drug prices drop precipitously in
the United States, but because HIV is a relatively new
plague, almost no HIV drugs are off-patent. Again, the situ-
ation is different for other major therapy categories. The
pioneer statin and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor
brands are already off-patent, with others to follow rapidly
(Express Scripts 2004).
The second characteristic of pharmaceutical pricing is
that manufacturers have strong incentives to engage in dif-
ferential pricing (which is often referred to as price discrim-
ination). Differential pricing increases profits by charging
higher prices in markets with greater willingness to pay.
This has the benefit of increasing returns to R&D (thus gen-
erating more new drugs) while providing drugs to popula-
tions that are relatively poor but that would gain benefits
that exceed marginal costs. If international markets can be
separated, economic theory suggests that prices will tend to
be proportional to per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
(so-called Ramsay prices, after the author who first devel-
oped this idea at a theoretical level; Danzon and Towse
2003). Differential drug pricing of patented drugs is almost
universal. Its greatest benefits can accrue to poor nations.
For example, South Africa has typically received drug
prices at much lower levels than those in Europe and the
United States (Reekie 1997).
Differential pricing also invites parallel trade, that is,
trans-shipment of pharmaceuticals from low-price markets
to high-price markets. If markets cannot be separated, mas-
sive parallel trade, which is feasible because shipping and
storage costs are typically low relative to product value,
would undermine differential pricing and eliminate its ben-
efits, especially in poor nations, by causing prices to con-
verge at prices prevalent in wealthy nations (see Danzon and
Towse 2003; Kremer 2002).
These characteristics of pharmaceutical pricing invite
governmental controls over price (Frank 2003). Manufac-
turers are not in a good position to resist price ceilings as
long as the ceilings remain comfortably above marginal
costs, without regard to the payoffs necessary to induce rea-
sonable R&D levels. All economically advanced nations
other than the United States control drug prices, employing
a wide variety of methods (Danzon and Furukawa 2003;
Kanavos 2002). In the United States, controls of different
forms have been implemented for Medicaid and the VA, and
close observers have noted that Medicare may well imple-
ment pervasive controls over drug prices in the drug benefit
that commences in 2006 (Frank 2003).
Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect price controls
regimes to take into account the fundamental economics of
new drug development. Individual nations have an incentive
to use price controls to free-ride on research in other nations,
especially the United States, which accounts for roughly
half of worldwide revenues (IMS Health 2003). This was
emphasized by a series of speeches in 2003 by then–FDA
Commissioner Mark McClellan (2003a, b), who is both an
economist and a physician. The resultant disparities
between domestic and international prices, including price
disparities among wealthy nations, have generated strong
political support for the importation of pharmaceuticals
from nations with price controls (Wilson 2004).
The political dynamics of HIV pricing in poor nations
have spilled over to other pharmaceuticals and wealthier
nations, as Kennedy, Harris, and Lord (2004) emphasize. In
poor nations, the drug price debate has extended to patented
drugs for other illnesses such as coronary heart disease, can-
cer, and depression. Much of this debate was triggered by
the WTO’s agreement on intellectual property, known as
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS).
The TRIPS agreement requires developing nations to intro-
duce patent protection gradually for various products,
including pharmaceuticals. A compromise hammered out at
the 2001 Doha WTO-TRIPS meetings permits nations to
override drug patents in the event of a public health emer-
gency (Kremer 2002; WTO 2001).
The TRIPS compromise on pharmaceutical patents was
intended primarily to encourage the use of generic drugs in
poor nation, but the language can apply to all nations, and
some advocates argue that the door has been opened for any
nation to abridge patent rights by declaring a health care
emergency (Kremer 2002). In January 2002, three South
Korean groups invoked the TRIPS compromise language in
a petition for a compulsory license from the Korean Intel-
lectual Property Office for Glivec (Gleevec in the United
States), a Novartis AG drug for chronic myeloid leukemia
and other cancers (Nam and Park 2002). South Korean law,
as that of most nations, allows compulsory licenses to be
issued to guard against the misuse of patent rights or to pro-
tect the public interest. The petition was denied, but the
move emphasizes what is likely an increasing trend of
undermining intellectual property rights. Unlike the poor
African countries for which the Doha mechanism was
intended, South Korea has a per capita GDP of more than
US$17,000 (2003 dollars at purchasing power parity),
which is roughly six times larger than the average per capita
GDP in sub-Saharan Africa.
What Must Be Done to Halt the HIV/AIDS
Epidemic?
The prices and availability of drugs have dominated public
discussion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The 15th Interna-
tional AIDS conference, sponsored by the International
AIDS Society and held in July 2004 in Bangkok, Thailand,
carried the slogan, “access for all.” However, the drugs at
the center of so much controversy can play only a relatively
limited role in the battle against HIV/AIDS. Progress will be
determined largely by factors other than drug prices.
Prevention
Barring unforeseen technological breakthroughs in the next
few years, prevention is the only way to halt or reverse the
worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. This was emphasized in a
July 2004 speech by Peter Piot, head of UNAIDS, at the
Bangkok conference: “Unless we scale up prevention with
the passion and urgency that is being brought to treatment,
‘access for all’ will remain a dream” (Nakashima and
Brown 2004, p. A13). Comparing the epidemic’s pace with
the UN’s goal of treating three million HIV patients by the144 Pharmaceuticals and the HIV Epidemic
2HIV drug prices are tracked in The Economist (2003) and TREAT Asia
(2004). On the near-absence of HIV drug patents in Africa, see the work of
Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001), whose results we discuss
subsequently.
end of 2005 (the “3 by 5” campaign), Piot pointed out that
at current rates, eight million new HIV infections will have
occurred in the meantime. Even the most expansive plans to
expand drug therapy cannot keep up with the epidemic. The
largest private funding organization, the Gates Foundation,
has also argued that “[u]nless annual HIV incidence falls
sharply from its current level of 5 million, treatment pro-
grammes will be unable to keep pace with the number of
people in need, and will become financially unsustainable”
(Gayle and Lange 2004, p. 6).
Nonetheless, HIV/AIDS remains a preventable condition
even in poor nations. The huge disparities in infection rates
between, for example, Senegal and Botswana or South
Africa are strongly correlated with fundamental differences
in sexual practices. In the massively populated Asian
nations, HIV has spread slowly during the two decades or
more in which it has been indigenous (see Halperin and
Epstein 2004; Ruxrungtham, Brown, and Phanuphakp
2004). Some nations already have realized striking reduc-
tions in HIV prevalence: in Uganda, from 21% in 1991 to
10% in 1998 and 6% in 2001 (Low-Beer 2004). Senegal,
Zambia, Thailand, and Cambodia have also achieved signif-
icant success (Merson 2001).
Infrastructure for Using HIV Drugs
Even if comprehensive drug therapy were possible, grave
doubts about its ultimate effects remain. Recent years have
witnessed a rapid drop in HIV drug prices in sub-Saharan
Africa by both patent holders and generic producers, in
addition to relatively free drug licensing, the outright aban-
donment of many drug patents, and the failure of manufac-
turers to seek patents in most African nations.2 The Econo-
mist (2003, pp. 77–79) noted, “Since 2000, the cost of the
drug cocktail needed to treat AIDS has fallen from $10,000
per patient annually to $300.”
However, these developments have simply exposed the
high costs of providing HIV therapy even when the drugs
themselves are virtually free. In a comment published in
Lancet on the eve of the Bangkok conference, Kumarasamy
(2003) noted that the costs of measuring CD4 cell counts (at
$25) and monitoring viral load (at $100 per test) exceed the
cost of generic antiretroviral therapy. An estimate of the
costs of implementing the UN’s “3 by 5” campaign shows
that using low-price generic drugs would cut the cost by less
than 20% (Gutierrez et al. 2004).
The availability of much cheaper HIV drugs also exposed
the potential dangers of imperfect drug therapy that could
easily occur when the drugs entered widespread use. Com-
plex multidrug regimens, which often involve comorbidi-
ties, require relatively expensive infrastructures to monitor
compliance, efficacy, and drug performance. Moreover,
they require diagnostic tests to assess CD4 cell counts in
order to start drug treatments neither too early (yielding seri-
ous side effects with minimal therapeutic gain) nor too late
(Sande and Ronald 2004).
The development and rapid approval of fixed-dose com-
bination drugs greatly simplifies administration but
increases the risks from side effects, drug interactions, and
individual differences in response to therapy. The prospect
of noncompliant therapies and a consequent increase in
drug-resistant HIV strains raise the alarming possibility that
even the best-intended use of current HIV drugs could do
more harm than good: “To scale up antiretroviral therapy for
HIV without ensuring infrastructure, including trained prac-
titioners, a safe and reliable drug delivery system, and sim-
ple but effective models for continuity of care, would be a
disaster, leading to ineffective treatment and rapid develop-
ment of resistance” (Sande and Ronald 2004, p. 267).
R&D
What is needed most is a simple, safe, and effective HIV
vaccine (Cohen 2001). Some researchers in the medical
community were once optimistic that the tools that con-
quered polio would soon be brought to bear against HIV,
though few serious researchers endorsed the view of the
Health and Human Services Secretary Heckler when, in
1984, she announced that an AIDS vaccine would probably
be available in two years (Cohen 2001). Creation of a vac-
cine for HIV has proved exceedingly difficult. Some 20 or
more vaccines are currently in trials, including one in a
large-scale trial in Thailand that is partly funded by the
National Institute of Health. The current consensus in the
research community is that the vaccines now in trials repre-
sent a narrow range of mechanisms, that none of the vac-
cines are likely to prove effective (the one in the Thai
research has already failed in two trials), and that a useful
vaccine lies at least a decade in the future (International
AIDS Vaccine Initiative 2004).
Vaccine development is far from the only R&D task in
dealing with HIV/AIDS. There is much to be done on the
current crop of approved drugs. Research goals include pre-
venting mother–child transmission, assessing optimal
dosage and drug combinations to forestall resistance,
designing simplified and improved combination therapies,
better managing side effects and comorbidities, and creating
cheaper diagnostic tests. To a substantial degree, this
research agenda is specific to the resource-limited environ-
ment of poor nations and regions, in which simplified treat-
ment regimens are the only feasible option, HIV targets are
rapidly evolving, and TB and other comorbidities are
endemic (Sande and Ronald 2004). This suggests that the
complete abandonment of intellectual property in these
nations is unwise, because patents may be necessary to
motivate even the relatively inexpensive research necessary
to exploit existing HIV drugs. The Indian firm Cipla, the
most prominent manufacturer of generic HIV drugs for sub-
Saharan Africa, recently shocked the international AIDS
community by seeking a patent in South Africa for one of its
combination drugs (The Wall Street Journal 2004).
The new research findings we discussed previously on the
prevention of prenatal transmission from mother to child are
an example of the research tasks that are yet to be com-
pleted. That research revealed a difficult trade-off: A simple
monotherapy provided reasonably good prevention of trans-
mission but also greatly increased the likelihood that the
mother would develop resistance to an essential class ofJournal of Public Policy & Marketing 145
HIV drugs, whereas more expensive combination therapy
avoided the resistance problem, at least in the short run
(Coovadia 2004; Jourdain et al. 2004). The discovery of this
trade-off caused consternation in the South African govern-
ment, which has long resisted spending money on sophisti-
cated HIV drugs (LaFraniere 2004). The prenatal transmis-
sion problem is typical of the trade-offs involved in
combination therapy in general, for which simplicity and
reliability in treatment often must be balanced with side
effects, drug interactions, and efficacy.
New and better antiretroviral drugs will be necessary until
an effective vaccine is available. The basic problem is illus-
trated simply in that even though there are already almost 30
different available HIV drugs, treatment often fails or is
infeasible in poor nations, and thousands of patients die
every year in even the wealthiest nations. HIV’s elusiveness
and adaptability requires a steady sequence of new drugs. It
is perhaps only a matter of time until the HIV variants in
Africa and Asia become sufficiently different from those in
the United States and western Europe such that drug devel-
opment in wealthy nations no longer produces drugs that
work equally well in the poverty-stricken regions where the
epidemic rages. This is another way that HIV research is
becoming more closely tied to the specific conditions in
poor nations and regions. Finally, there is the seemingly
low-technology requirement to create reliable microbio-
cides, which could prevent transmission through sexual
behavior, even if these products cannot defeat HIV itself
(Coplan, Mitchnick, and Rosenberg 2004).
Can the Stakeholder Model Work?
We believe that the stakeholder model is fundamentally
flawed because it would blunt new drug development and
do little to help solve the problems that motivate its use.
Can Stakeholders Agree, and If So, Would Their
Agreements Persist?
We begin by noting that an essential feature of a stakeholder
model, which is a common set of core interests sufficiently
large to form a basis for both industry operations and public
policy, may not exist. As one careful treatment makes clear,
the gulf between industry interests and those of NGOs and
other stakeholders is wide (Reisel and Sama 2003, pp. 374,
381). These gaps apply not only to prices but also to the
kinds of drugs to develop (so-called me-too drugs, or new
members of an existing therapeutic class, as opposed to
entirely new therapeutic categories), how and where to
develop them, how to market them, and how much support
to provide for distribution and administration.
The pharmaceutical industry cannot reach explicit or
implicit agreements as a group, especially on such sensitive
matters as research plans and pricing behavior. Because
understandings must encompass research agendas that
occupy 5 to 15 years, entry and exit may alter the complex-
ion of the industry itself. Even informal enforcement of
broad understandings (e.g., to pursue a certain line or
research) may prove impossible. If understandings were suf-
ficiently concrete to provide a guide to future behavior, it
would be difficult to imagine how they could withstand
antitrust scrutiny.
This is not to say that the pharmaceutical industry and its
more responsible critics cannot agree on anything of impor-
tance, but even when they do agree, their common interests
are unlikely to persist in the pressure of events. If manufac-
turers succeed in developing products that the other stake-
holders want (e.g., a malaria vaccine), they will have created
a new situation that requires a new agreement about pricing
and distribution. These negotiations are likely to be resolved
at price levels that, though providing ample supplies of the
new vaccine, would be too low to motivate the next genera-
tion of vaccines and (if such negotiations had been con-
ducted years earlier) would have been too low to have moti-
vated the vaccine now subject to negotiation (Kremer 2002).
That reasonable people may disagree on how much profit is
needed as an R&D incentive greatly complicates the situa-
tion (see Goozner 2003; Reisel and Sama 2003, pp. 370,
372).
The Stakeholder Model Versus Pharmaceutical
R&D
Even if stakeholders could reach fundamental agreement
that would persist in the tumult of politics and marketplace,
another equally fundamental difficulty arises. In general, the
consenses envisioned for the stakeholder model pertain to
pricing, marketing, distribution, and so on, for drugs that
already exist. However, if the stakeholder model is to work,
it must be forward looking. Manufacturers must be able to
foresee stakeholder agreements and informal understand-
ings years in advance to mount the R&D necessary to create
the drugs whose prices and availability will one day form
the focus of a new round of stakeholder bargaining.
Moreover, this predictable future set of common core
interests and mutual understandings would need to provide
the profits sufficient to motivate the drug development that
stakeholders agree is necessary. This appears to be an insur-
mountable problem. The nature of a stakeholder agreement
five or ten years in the future will depend on a constellation
of political and industry forces yet to be fully identified and
measured. These include new firms and such inscrutable
forces as disease advocacy groups, international develop-
ments including the course of epidemics, changes in medical
practice (note the large regional variations in Medicare prac-
tice that Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner [2002] describe and
the striking international variations in the use of antidepres-
sants that Fleming and Morice [2004] describe), and, most
important, the compensation that governments and organi-
zations will provide for what has been developed. Unfortu-
nately, it is difficult to imagine the concrete principles that
can be expected to apply when challenging drug research is
finished (see Reisel and Sama 2003, p. 381). All this is in
addition to the usual uncertainties surrounding R&D, such
as the robustness of scientific breakthroughs.
Is there any reason to expect that the stakeholder
approach will overcome these difficulties? Would it promise
to yield sufficient foreseeable profits to bring forward the
drugs on which the stakeholders would eventually agree?
The best predictor is probably the stakeholder views that
have emerged in the past. Those views appear to be rela-
tively unconcerned about R&D incentives. Most stakehold-
ers have long agreed that the world needs better TB drugs
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if such products were developed, the associated intellectual
property would not be respected, and the firms developing
the products could not expect to earn a profit that was com-
mensurate with the financial risks (see Kremer 2002). Par-
ties who want to be included among the stakeholders in
pharmaceutical research envision a world in which the pay-
offs for the development of new drugs would fall far short
of compensation for R&D investments. Publicly financed
investment, which could come in various forms, would
become the primary source of new drugs (Hubbard and
Love 2004). Recognizing the insecurity of intellectual prop-
erty for drugs targeted at diseases endemic in developing
nations, Michael Kremer and others propose the creation of
a public fund to guarantee purchase of essential new drugs,
such as vaccines and treatments for malaria and TB (Kremer
2002).
The Problem of Costs and Efficiency
The undermining of R&D incentives is perhaps the greatest
adverse effect of the stakeholder model for the pharmaceu-
tical industry, but other issues are important. In a
stakeholder-dominated world, parties with no direct finan-
cial stake would strongly influence or even make decisions
ranging from R&D to manufacturing, testing, drug therapy,
and investment in infrastructure. The absence of a market
test for these activities invites inefficiency. In the traditional
nonstakeholder world, the market penalizes failure even as
it rewards success. Persistent attention to the pharmaceutical
industry’s profits tends to obscure the essential role of
industry losses in drug development. Because the opportu-
nities to spend money on testing potential drugs is, for all
practical purposes, unlimited, a necessary check on spend-
ing is the prospect of absorbing the costs of failure, which
Merck did when four late-stage drug candidates failed in
2003, despite the firm’s formidable reputation in pharma-
ceutical research (Landers and Lublin 2003).
Equally important are the tasks of manufacturing, distrib-
ution, and drug therapy. The mixed record of the impact of
WHO and other international organizations on vaccination
in poor nations (Mahmoud 2004) suggests that it is unlikely
that these organizations will achieve reasonable efficiency
in dealing with far more expensive and difficult drug thera-
pies for HIV/AIDS. An article in The Economist (2004, p.
79) summed up the situation: “Serious amounts of money
are now being made available to deal with AIDS in poor
countries. That is good news, but it is bringing its own prob-
lems.” We note subsequently that African nations with
access to large quantities of cheap HIV drugs have often not
been able to use them, even in Botswana, perhaps the best-
governed sub-Saharan nation.
It is assumed that international organizations would
undertake most of the work involved in distribution and use
of pharmaceuticals, but the stakeholder model presumably
involves far greater participation by pharmaceutical firms in
such arduous and costly tasks. It is difficult to know how
much firms would be expected to do to ensure access and
proper usage, in addition to supporting and even participat-
ing in public health training and enterprises. It is clear that
such activities are essentially unlimited in their scope and
expense, which raises serious questions about the financial
burdens associated with vigorous pursuit of the stakeholder
model for the pharmaceutical industry. Without an available
practical example, it is difficult to assess such basic matters
as the types of activities and costs that would be associated
with the stakeholder model.
The Stakeholder Model Applied to
HIV/AIDS
The HIV/AIDS crisis provides an excellent opportunity to
explore how the stakeholder model would work at a practi-
cal level and to illustrate the fundamental difficulties in such
an approach.
What Is the Consensus?
The pharmaceutical industry continues to develop new HIV
drugs as older ones encounter the inevitable problem of
drug-resistant HIV strains. The industry trade organization
PhRMA (2003) lists approximately 80 HIV drugs and vac-
cines in development, despite more than a decade of criti-
cism and a shift in the locus of the epidemic from wealthy
to poor regions, which has undoubtedly deterred some firms
from entering a market characterized by indifferent returns
and difficult public relations. We and other researchers have
often been informed privately that large firms have refrained
from entering the HIV/AIDS market and indeed are relieved
that they had not done so earlier. Bate (2003) documents
that 27% fewer companies were working on antiretroviral
research in 2003 than in 1997, with fewer new compounds
in the development phase.
Prices have also plunged in the past several years, and
patents in sub-Saharan Africa are essentially abandoned or
unenforced (as we discuss subsequently). Nonetheless,
intense criticism of the industry continued at the July 2004
Bangkok conference, where the Pfizer chief executive offi-
cer and the chief of the U.S. AIDS program were booed by
the audience when they prepared to speak (Mader 2004).
Much of the criticism focused on the United States’ (by far
the largest funder of HIV/AIDS programs in sub-Saharan
Africa) waiting for FDA approval of new combination
generic drug formulations rather than immediately purchas-
ing generic brands that were already approved by the WHO
through less thorough scientific assessments (Bate and Tren
2004). Both activists and mainstream international HIV/
AIDS organizations have rejected the idea that either the
United States or other organizations should purchase
branded drugs rather than the cheapest available generics.
This rationale, which eliminates industry profits from serv-
ing the needs of poor nations, leaves no room for a consen-
sus that includes the industry itself.
Other signs also suggest that stakeholder consenses will
not be easily forged. The industry has engaged in several
initiatives in support of public health activities, including
AIDS-related operations. For example, Merck has entered
into arrangements with four African countries including
Botswana, where Merck and the Gates Foundation have
each given $US50 million over five years to support and
enhance the government’s public health program. Pfizer has
funded the construction of an HIV/AIDS clinic and research
and training institute at Makerere University Medical
School in Kampala. That operation is run by the Academic
Alliance for AIDS Care and Prevention, for which U.S.Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 147
3The companies involved are Boerhinger-Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers-
Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, and Roche.
experts train doctors, nurses, and others to treat infectious
diseases. However, there is little reason to believe that these
and other activites have been given significant weight by
other stakeholders.
An example is the fate of the Accelerated Access Initia-
tive (AAI), a public–private partnership that involved sev-
eral pharmaceutical firms and UNAIDS, which was
launched in May 2000.3 Improvement of HIV/AIDS pre-
vention, treatment, and care was sought by AAI. Success
was mixed, as it involved drug industry involvement in
activities for which the group had no particular expertise or
comparative advantage. Drug activists dismissed the AAI as
a public relations exercise by drug companies and accused
the companies of using the initiative to discourage develop-
ing countries from using cheap generic drugs in order to
maintain a larger share of the market for their patented ver-
sions, despite the minimal role of patent (see Act-Up Paris
2002).
It might be assumed that when a manufacturer decides to
provide a necessary drug at low prices, or even for free, con-
struction of a consensus on whether or how to use the drug
would be relatively straightforward. Unfortunately, this is
not necessarily the case. An illuminating example is the tor-
tured deliberations and false starts that accompanied the
introduction of a superior combination malaria drug in
Kenya in the late 1990s (Shretta et al. 2001). The most dif-
ficult issues—drug resistance, the impact on the overall
health system, infrastructure requirements, and so on—are
familiar themes, but the difficulties are far greater when
HIV/AIDS drug treatment rather than treatment of malaria
is considered.
These developments, which range from small-scale activ-
ities to massive changes in prices and intellectual property
protections, do little to suggest that a broad consensus or
understanding is likely to emerge with the force and stabil-
ity necessary to support a stakeholder approach to the role of
the pharmaceutical industry in HIV/AIDS. Rather, a con-
sensus would leave pharmaceutical firms with little role
beyond developing new drugs and then essentially giving
them away.
HIV Drug Patents in Africa
With the possible exception of drug prices, no topic in the
worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic has been more contentious
than patents, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of this
was triggered by a 1998 lawsuit that was brought by the
industry against the South African government when it
sought to authorize use of generic versions of patented
drugs. The furor over that litigation, which was settled in
2001 largely on the government’s terms (The Wall Street
Journal 2001), obscured two essential points.
First, the industry’s primary motive in the patent litiga-
tion was apparently to maintain its intellectual property
rights, not so much with the idea of supporting prices as to
maintain control over trans-shipment from low-price to
high-price countries (PhRMA 2001). Second, on the whole,
HIV drug patent rights have been indifferently sought or
awarded, and they have had negligible effect. With a few
exceptions, HIV drug patents have been rare in sub-Saharan
Africa. In their census of HIV patents in that region, Attaran
and Gillespie-White (2001) found that most nations did not
respect patents at all, that most HIV drugs were not patented
when patents were offered, and that the state of patenting
bore little relationship to the actual use of HIV drugs.
Regardless of the existence of patents, several drug devel-
opers have offered their drugs at discounted prices or for
free to developing nations (see The Economist 2003;
TREAT Asia 2004). In addition, some companies, such as
GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol-Myers-Squibb, have entered
into voluntary license agreements that allow generic drug
companies to produce copies of their patented drugs (Zim-
merman 2001).
R&D Incentives
We have described the wide range of R&D activities that are
necessary to restrain or curtail the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We
also noted that much of this research is or would be (if it
comes to pass) devoted to matters that are relevant mainly to
poor regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, R&D
incentives are an essential factor in assessing a stakeholder
approach to HIV/AIDS.
In a sense, a stakeholder model is likely to diminish R&D
incentives simply by making the pharmaceutical industry a
more costly enterprise as manufacturers meet the expanded
requirements of diverse groups and organizations. However,
there are also two ways that the stakeholder approach could
undermine R&D.
The first pertains to the question of how prices and prof-
its can be realized after firms develop innovative drugs.
Economic demand from the populations of sub-Saharan
Africa is extremely small. However, there is strong potential
demand from the organizations funded by the wealthy West-
ern nations and individuals. These organizations, which
range from the U.S. government to WHO, the World Bank,
and the Gates Foundation, could provide the payoffs that
would motivate R&D aimed at the HIV/AIDS needs of even
the poorest nations. Unfortunately, there is little likelihood
that a stakeholder consensus would involve such incentives.
The unrelenting and nearly unanimous plea for all interna-
tional organizations, including U.S. government agencies, to
purchase either generic or branded drugs at generic prices
largely rules out the possibility that a stakeholder model
would generate reasonable R&D incentives.
A second issue relates to R&D operations in sub-Saharan
Africa. South Africa was one of the few African nations that
had a large and profitable research-based pharmaceutical
sector. In the past decade, South Africa has experienced a
gradual decline of pharmaceutical manufacturing, with
approximately 25 drug manufacturers closing their plants.
To some extent, this reflects the wave of consolidations in
the industry worldwide, but the growth and entrenchment of
anti-industry attitudes and laws in South Africa has surely
contributed to this decline. This trend, which, as we have
shown, is buttressed by most putative stakeholder interests,
seems likely to discourage the rebirth and growth of an
indigenous pharmaceutical research industry. Also relevant
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pharmaceutical industry has become prominent in the world
generic drug market. The Indian pharmaceutical industry
has also begun to move aggressively into original research,
using that vast country’s reservoir of technical talent, but it
is evident that this development relies on the establishment
of patent rights and the prospect of profits rather than on a
new stakeholder consensus (Slater 2003).
Bottlenecks and Drug Access
If international agencies and sub-Saharan Africa govern-
ments had been ready to use HIV treatments when they
became affordable, there would have been a swift expansion
in HAART for the several million HIV victims whose CD4
counts indicated that they were ready for drug therapy.
Many surveys have found that this did not occur after drug
prices plummeted and generic manufacturers entered. There
are several reasons for this.
In some cases, national governments simply refused to
pursue HAART. Perhaps the most remarkable example
occurred in South Africa, where, in 2001, the health minis-
ter announced to a shocked crowd of AIDS activists that she
did not intend to distribute the generic drugs that had just
become available after the industry litigation over drug
patents was settled (Schoofs 2001). One reason is that both
South African President Mbeki and Health Minister Manto
Tshabalala Msimang publicly doubted that HIV was the
cause of AIDS, and they believed that antiretroviral therapy
would do more harm than good. The minister recently reaf-
firmed a long-standing position opposed to widespread use
of antiretrovirals to prevent prenatal HIV transmission, rec-
ommending breast-feeding instead (Business Day 2004;
Cauvin 2001). Previously, the minister had stated that she
would not support the use of antiretroviral drugs in
government-run hospitals until monitoring and care
matched the standards of western European hospitals (New
York Times 2001).
In other countries, the problem has not been hostility
toward HAART but an inability to take advantage of drugs
and supporting funds when they become available. The evi-
dence from Botswana is that political will and bureaucratic
competence is more important in tackling HIV/AIDS than
cash contributions from the pharmaceutical industry or other
sources (Tren 2003).
This is typical of events in sub-Saharan Africa in the past
few years. Despite the efforts of pharmaceutical firms and
international agencies, treatment rates in Africa continue to
be extremely low: less than 7% of people for whom
HAART is indicated (Gayle and Lange 2004). This is
despite large increases in spending and the rapid decline in
drug prices. The largest single international effort, the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, has
been greatly delayed in awarding and disbursing grants
because of the inability of recipient nations to meet the
Global Fund’s standards for performance-based disburse-
ment (Brugha et al. 2004).
This is not to say that these nations should simply plunge
ahead with using any available drugs, which would do more
harm than good by accelerating drug resistance while help-
ing few victims. These nations face difficult choices when
they decide on mass HIV drug treatment, and these choices
involve substantial commitments, including recruiting
trained physicians into the field (Kumrasamy 2004). Rather,
the point is that drug prices and access are not the main
obstacles to effective treatment.
New Tasks, New Costs
Although the elements of the stakeholder model are any-
thing but clear, one of the elements is that pharmaceutical
firms will do much more than just develop, manufacture,
and market drugs. They also serve as sources of expertise,
funding, and perhaps even personnel for the larger tasks of
delivering and administering drug therapy and associated
activities such as diagnostics and monitoring.
This raises two difficulties. The first is cost. The relent-
less push for generic drugs, which promises to be part of any
consensus approach to HIV/AIDS in poor nations, effec-
tively removes industry profits from this market. Yet the
extra costs of making HAART work in practice is likely to
be large, as is evidenced by the slow pace of HAART in
places in which considerable sums are already being spent.
There seems to be little reason to saddle these costs on phar-
maceutical firms because they bear no relationship with
industry resources. It might be asked how the industry could
supply the needed sums, given the presumed lack of profits
from HIV drugs. The answer is, profits from drugs sales in
other regions and for non-HIV products. This reasoning sug-
gests that as a stakeholder model becomes more likely, the
financial incentives for exiting the HIV/AIDS market alto-
gether become stronger.
The second difficulty lies in the notion of comparative
advantage. One of the two essential elements in winning the
battle against HIV/AIDS—an effective vaccine or an out-
right drug cure—can be supplied only by R&D that will be
funded primarily in the private sector. (Good governance,
the other element, is discussed subsequently.) Although
considerable public and nonprofit resources are spent on
vaccine development, the historical record in such activities
as TB and malaria suggests that there is little likelihood that
the solution will emerge from that sector; R&D is the
supreme comparative advantage of the private pharmaceuti-
cal sector.
However, to hold the industry responsible for efficient
distribution and use of drugs is to ask the industry to under-
take activities in which it has little comparative advantage.
In developed countries, the industry does not perform the
bulk of routine activities such as storage and distribution,
leaving much of that to specialist wholesalers. Pharmaceuti-
cal firms are traditionally distant from the actual use of all
but a few specialty drugs. In the far more difficult circum-
stances of treating HIV/AIDS in poor nations, industry
expertise is even less relevant. Given such needs as cold
storage for many HIV drugs, it might make more sense to
involve large fresh grocery chains, such as Tesco, or rely on
agencies with a good track record, such as International
Healthcare Distributors in South Africa. Regardless, there is
little doubt that specialized expertise is needed. We have
noted that international agencies have done a surprisingly
poor job of distributing other, simpler products, such as
antibiotics and vaccines, that also require special handling
(Mahmoud 2004).
Events in Botswana illustrate some of these points.
Botswana has the highest rate of HIV infection in the world,
which is estimated at slightly more than one-third of the
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tical firm Merck, along with the Gates Foundation, has
offered tens of millions of dollars for HIV/AIDS work. To
date, the efforts in Botswana have been highly successful,
though less successful than the country’s leadership had
hoped. By June 2004, many HIV/AIDS clinics had been
built, and approximately 15,000 Botswanans were receiving
treatment. (This was well under the government’s goal of
60,000 people, presumably because of a combination of
stigmatization, ignorance, or inaccurate estimates of the
HIV-positive population.) Despite these successes, most of
the government’s AIDS budget remains unspent (Attaran
2004). Despite Merck’s cash and in-kind contributions,
Botswana wisely uses many non-Merck drugs while
employing several different triple therapies. The success of
this enterprise depends not on pharmaceutical expertise but
on organizational skills, political will, and continued fund-
ing from available sources.
The Governance Problem
That the bulk of sub-Saharan African nations are poorly
governed is hardly a matter of dispute. The poverty that both
fosters the spread of HIV/AIDS and hinders its treatment is
widely believed to be an inevitable consequence of gover-
nance that often barely reaches rudimentary levels.
Several signs suggest that dramatic progress against HIV/
AIDS may need to await improvements in governance. On
the whole, the nations that have experienced striking
improvements in how they are governed (i.e., Uganda and
Botswana) have also made the most progress in the battle
against HIV/AIDS.
Nonetheless, serious governance problems remain even
in South Africa, one of the most enlightened sub-Saharan
nations. Home to one of the largest HIV-positive popula-
tions in the world, South Africa has been unable to spend its
HIV/AIDS budget. Quite apart from the public doubts about
HIV therapy expressed by South Africa’s president and
minister of health, the provinces frequently roll over their
AIDS budget to subsequent financial years because they do
not have the capacity to spend it (Sunday Times 2004).
However, the overall health infrastructure, including higher-
level medical staffs and educational facilities, remain
severely underfunded as many of the best personnel migrate
to wealthier countries. This is unfortunate because strong
intellectual capabilities are needed to make the difficult
choices necessary to propagate reasonable and efficient
practices in treating HIV/AIDS.
Conclusion: The Dangers of Abandoning
the Traditional Profit-Motivated Model
It is natural that the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic would
focus critical attention on the pharmaceutical industry. The
industry’s unique cost structure ensures both large profit
margins and striking international price disparities. Its
prices and profits are supported by the slender thread of
government-granted patents, which can be removed as eas-
ily as they are granted, absent international agreements that
prohibit patent abridgment. That HIV/AIDS migrated
rapidly and relentlessly from wealthy countries to the poor-
est regions brought all these factors into sharp relief. That
the greatest beneficiaries of future research breakthroughs
would be the world’s poorest people dictates that the preser-
vation of R&D incentives will be a delicate task in public
policy.
In a fundamental sense, much of the criticism of drug
pricing and related matters in treating HIV/AIDS in poor
nations is misplaced. A rapid drop in prices, accompanied
by a near-abandonment of intellectual property and the
widespread availability of inexpensive generic drugs, has
revealed that stumbling blocks in progress against HIV/
AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa are not drug prices or patents.
Rather, the barriers are inadequate health care infrastruc-
tures, an inability to administer drug therapy when it is
needed and to avoid inappropriate drug therapy, the threat
and reality of drug-resistant HIV strains, resistance to rea-
sonable HIV therapy by governments, and severe adminis-
trative bottlenecks that have nothing to do with drug pricing
or availability. Also evident is that much R&D remains to be
done in the use of available drugs and in the development of
new drugs, especially vaccines, if the HIV/AIDS epidemic
is to be curtailed before it runs its natural and tragic course.
Many critics of the industry’s behavior in connection with
HIV/AIDS have nonetheless arrived at the simplest of solu-
tions: remove patent rights, request cost-based drug sup-
plies, or permit free licensing to generic manufacturers. At
the same time, there has been a firestorm of criticism of the
pharmaceutical industry in a much broader context, focus-
ing on price disparities among wealthy countries and on the
high costs in developed economies of both R&D and the
products generated by R&D. The outcome has been propos-
als for a new approach to the drug industry, involving not
only changes in public policy but also the remarkable idea
that the industry itself should adopt a stakeholder model to
replace the traditional capitalist, profit-driven stockholder
model.
Although the stakeholder model is hardly well-defined,
its essential elements raise serious problems, including an
inability to forge a lasting and predictable consensus on
such basic matters as R&D and pricing, unnecessary costs
and inefficiencies, and a near-certain undermining of R&D
incentives. These difficulties gain force and concreteness
when the stakeholder model is arrayed against the specifics
of the HIV/AIDS crisis in what are often referred to as the
“resource-limited” economies of sub-Saharan Africa. It is
difficult to imagine what the terms of a stakeholder
approach might be, how that approach could help solve the
problems facing poor nations, or how it could help generate
the new medical technology—especially an HIV vaccine—
that is desperately needed and is least likely to emerge from
the government or nonprofit sectors.
A potential and tragic cost of a new regime in which some
sort of stakeholder model prevails is that the world HIV/
AIDS market could become completely segmented. Phar-
maceutical firms would develop drugs for the HIV variants
found in wealthy countries, providing progressively less
help to the poorest nations as their respective HIV popula-
tions steadily diverge. A situation parallel to that prevailing
for malaria and TB would occur, in which the drugs suffi-
cient to treat the few victims in wealthy countries are of lim-
ited use in the countries in which victims number in the mil-
lions and in which no new TB drugs have been introduced
in decades. The stakeholders will be left with little to show
for abandoning the traditional drug development model.150 Pharmaceuticals and the HIV Epidemic
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